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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel announces that the 
real is rational and the rational is real.1 In the second 
edition of The Shorter Logic, Hegel refers to this statement 
and characterizes it ~s the dominant theme of his philosoph-
ical position. 2 It might be said that no other statement from 
his position has provoked more controversy than the above. 
Controversy, however, tends not to clarify but to bifurcate, 
that is, to separate those who oppose such a statement from 
those who defend it. The result is only opposition and de-
fense without any genuine understanding. Hegel's principle 
that the real is rational has, in fact, been largely mis-
understood,3 
This misunderstanding does not apply just to those who 
oppose Hegel's metaphysics or to those who oppose everybody'S 
metaphysics. It applies as well to some who have undertaken 
to interpret Hegel for t heir colleagues and students. 
1. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 10. (POR) 
2. Wallace, Logic of Hegel, 10. (LOH) 
3. Knox translates this statement as "what is rational is 
actual and what is actual is rational. 11 But this points up 
the problem all the more, 
1 
As an example of the f i rst category, not the opponents 
of Hegel's metaphysics but the opponents of metaphysics in 
general, namely, the analytic philosophers will be treated. 
2 
As an example of the latter category, the foremost interpreter 
of Hegel for the student, namely, W.T. Stace will be treated. 
There are two reasons for choosing to discuss the 
analytic philosophers. First of all, to discuss any phil-
osophy which is oppos:ed to all of metaphysics is certainly 
a more general undertaking than to discuss one philosopher 
who is opposed only to Hegel's metaphysics.. This, however, 
though important, is not a sufficient reason. For, it 
might well be that a metaphysician's objection to H~~el is 
based not on his objection to metaphysics as a whole, but 
rather on his adherence to what Bradley has termed a rival 
theory of his own.1 In this case, his opposition to Hegel 
is not so much opposition as it is a defense of his own 
theory. 
Second of all, the analytic objections to He gel can 
be satisfactorily answered from Hegel's point of view. 
Indeed, not only can these objections be answered, but 
also it can be shown that Hegel• s metaphysics and 
1. Bradley, Appearamce and Reality, 1. (AR) 
analytic philosophy are not contradictory but compatible, 
if not complementary. This can not be said for any other 
objection to Hegel. 
Stace, however, presents quite a different problem. 
Here we have a specific interpretation of Hegel's system 
and it is to this interpretation that this thesis is 
opposed. For, a misinterpretation of Hegel is far more 
serious than opposition to him. Whenever anyone seriously 
attempts to present to his students and colleagues the 
results of his work, these results should be treated 
with sympathy and respect simply by invoking the Golden 
Rule. Only with sympathy and respect can these results 
be thoroughly understood. To approach such work with a 
preconceived notion of ~at it is the man is about to 
say so that one can agree with him more readily or dis-
agree with him more readily is to lack both sympathy and 
respect. Such a deficiency can be excused Where the work 
being studied is obscure, ~s indeed Hegel's work is ob-
scure. However, this only accentuates the problem, for 
then the student and colleague tend to read not the 
original but the interpreter's interpretation of the or-
iginal. 
The nature of this thesis is not evangelistic. 
It does not propose to convert anyone to Hegel's point 
of view. This writer .does not, in fact, follow Hegel's 
point of view. Any such attempt, thererore, would be 
3 
hypocrisy. But this thesis does intend to show that 
Hegel's system can be given a far more intelligible 
interpretation than the one offered by Stace. It pro-
poses to do so using not the Phenomenology of Mind which 
is more susceptible to our analysis than any other work 
of Hegel, but rather using his Logic, Philosophy of Right, 
and Philosophy of Mind. These three works are most 
susceptible to Stace•s interpretation. Indeed, if an 
alternative interpretation can be provided using for 
the most part these three, then the reinforcement pro-
vided by even the most superficial study of the Phenomenology 
of l~d may prove decisive in favor of this thesis• 
interpretation. 
Furthermore, something a bit more subjective is 
at work in this undertaking. It seems one should assume 
that the man vho has written what one studies is not a 
fool. That is to say, the interpretation supplied by 
Stace is not an intelligible one, to this writer. His 
criterion of intelligibility at this level of maturity 
is most certainly not adequate, but it is at work if 
only to reflect that level of maturity. Stace•s inter-
pretation does not make sense to this writer. If Hegel 
really says what Stace says he says, then, it seems that 
Hegel is muddled. This writer assumes that Hegel is 
not and this assumption is not so much flattery directed 
toward Hegel as it is flattery directed toward this writer. 
4 
For, in assuming that Hegel is not muddled, he implies 
that Hegel must make sense to him. This means that what 
makes sense to him is not muddled and, therefore, he is 
not a fool. As is the case with every synthetic state-
ment, this last one may not be true. 
There are two ways in which one can interpret any 
philosopher. The first is to try to be faithful to what-
ever it is the philosopher says, despite whatever it is 
he says. The second is to try to make sense of what-
ever it is he says, in spite of whatever it is he says. 
The ideal interpretation would contain a balanve of both 
tendencies. 
The first way requires unusual philosophical and 
personal maturity. The second way requires some ingenuity 
and a very clear sense of what it is that makes sense to 
the interpreter. 
It may well be that what makes sense to the inter-
preter does not make sense to the philosopher who is 
undergoing such antiseptic interpretation. Since this 
writer is confident that he fulfills the requirements 
set by the second way to a point where he knows what 
makes sense to him, and since he is not too confident 
that he fulfills the requirements set by the first way, 
it is quite possible that Hegel does not mean what this 
thesis proposes he means. Therefore, this writer may be 
the fool, and not Hegel. But since the above is a 
5 
r 
"methodological possibility wherever two minds are gathered 
together, or perhaps we should say gathered apart,n1 all 
that can be done at this stage of analysis is to recognize 
the limitations of the analysis, itself. 
1. This remark is due to Professor John H. Lavely. 
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2. The Method of the Thesis 
The second chapter wil~ present an analysis of 
Hegel• s logic. The following method will be adopted. 
Only the first three categories of each book of either 
the Shorter or Larger Logic will be considered. The 
reason for doing so is that these first three categories 
of each book are crucial in the exposition to be presented 
in the third chapter dealing with Hegel's conception of 
philosophy. 
The discussion of each category will be preceded 
by a series of quotations from Hegel and Stace. The 
criterion for including passages from Hegel is the 
following: wherever any passage gas suggested this thesis• 
interpretation, it is to be included; Wherever any passage 
confirms this interpretation, it is to be included. Only 
the key passages on each category have been chosen. 
This is not to say that passages at odds with this 
thesis' interpretation have been intentionally omitted. 
For the purpose of exposition, these have been omitted 
in this section. In dealing with Stace 1 s interpretation 
in the latter section of chapter two, these have been 
taken into consideration. 
The criterion for including passages from Stace 
is the followJing: wherever any passage illuminates ~ 
selection fram Hegel, it is to be included; wherever any 
passage contradicts this thesis' interpretation, it is 
to be included. Only the key passages have been selected. 
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Following these selections will appear an analysis 
of the passages from Hegel. These comprise Being, Nothing 
and Becoming from the Sein book; Identity, Difference and 
Ground from the Wesen book; Universal, Particular and 
Individual from the Begriff book. 
Analytic objections to Hegel's logic will then be 
presented noting the major differences in systems of 
intelligibility between Hegel's position and the analytic 
one. These objections have been chosen in such a way 
as to clearly illustrate those major differences. 
Lastly, Stace's interpretation will be presented 
and compared to this thesis' interpretation. 
In the third chapter, a formal interpretation of 
Hegel's statement, the rational is actual and the actual 
is rational, is presented. This interpretation is achieved 
in two ways. First, arguments are developed from Hegel's 
direct statements. Second, this writer has argued from 
the way in which Hegel might argue had he been defending 
this thesis in modern and clear English. 
This interpretation includes Hegel's conception 
of empiricism, his principle of intelligibility and his 
conception of philosophy. All three depend to a large 
extent on the analysis offered in the second chapter. 
8 
The last section of the third chapter compares 
Stace's Hegel with the interpretation developed in this 
thesis. 
The fourth chapter deals with alternatives to 
Hegel's conception of philosophy. Here the argument 
is presented as Hegel might have presented it if he were 
considering the issue in modern and clear English. The 
section dealing with genuine positivism tries to resolve 
the conflict between analytic philosophy and Hegel•s 
metaphysics as this conflict was revealed in the pre-
ceding chapter. Stace's interpretation and the objections 
to it are compared with analytic philosophy's relation 
to Hegel's metaphysics. In dealing with other alternatives 
aside from positivism, the principal object has been to 
answer the implicit objection of analytic philosophers to 
metaphysics, namely, that it has no method of verification. 
9 
Chapter II 
AN ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S LOGIC 
1. The First Three Categories of ~ 
i. Being 
Pure Being makes the beginning; 
because it is on one hand pure thought, 
and on the other immediacy itself, simple 
and indeterminate; and the first beginning 
cannot be mediated by anything, or be 
further determine.d.l 
The indeter.minate, as we here have 
it, is the blank we begin,: wi th, not a 
featurelessness reached by abstraction, not 
the elimination of all character, but the 
original featurelessness whiCh precedes 
all definite character and is the very2 first of all. And this we call Being. 
The categories of being are, roughly, 
the categories used by common sense and un-
reflective consciousness to cognize this 
world.3 
On the basis of the analysis given these p8ssa§Bs, 
the subject of Hegel's discussion is s~ple and ~ediate 
awareness, sometimes called the specious present by the 
more technical metaphysician. Such a condition is simple 
and immediate in two distinct but important senses: (1} it 
cannot be analyzed further into its components; (2) it 
is the beginning, a beginning whose priority is phenomeno-
logical or epistemic, rather than logical. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 158. 
2. Ibid., 159. 
3. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, 129. (POH) 
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To clariry the above concept, consider the rollowing 
three conceptions, the rirst two or which are not exactly 
what is meant by the above, but considered in light of 
the third clarify what in fact is meant. 
The first of these is Aristotle's rirst matter. He 
describes it in two ways. First, it is "that of mich 
everything else is predicated, but itself is never pre-
dicated or anything."1 Or it is 11 that which in itself 
is neither a particular thd.:tl~F; , nor a quantity, and is not, 
in ract, designated by any of the categories."2 This is 
to be distinguished from corporeal matter, since it applies 
to insensible as well as sensible substances.3 
It is pure potentiality, that is, the ability to 
take on any form, but is, itselr, formless; if matter as 
opposed to rorm in any substance is defined as th~t which 
is relatively indefinite rrom the point of view of 
deriniteness, then rirst matter may be defined ~s 
absolute indefiniteness. 
The second or these is Bowne's pure being. Bowne 
defines being as activity. "Being must be viewed as 
essentially causal and active. n4 Pure be1ng, on the 
1. Aristotle, Meta;ehisics, 171. (AM) 
2. Idem. 
3. Aristotle, AM, 172. 
4. Bowne, Meta;ehzsics, 17. (BM) 
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other hand, is neither causal nor active. 
Pure being is objectively nothing, 
and even if it were a possible existence, 
we could neither reach it nor use it with-
out bad logic. Only the definite can exist, 
and only the definite can found the definite.l 
In the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel describes the 
following situation: 
Rather, the thing, the fact, is, 
and it is merely because it is. It is--
that is the essential point lOr sense 
knowledge, and that fact of being, that 
simple immediacy constitutes the truth ••• 
conscious is I --nothing more, a pure 
this.z 
If Aristotle's first matter and Bownes's pure being 
are conceived as conscious, the idea of absolute in-
definiteness, t the absence of all formed content but the 
potentiality for assuming formed content, the mere fact 
of "to be 11 without being anything in particular is what 
is meant by simple awareness in Hegel's logic. 
Assuming that the purpose of the Sein boo.k is to 
present to the understanding an object complete with all 
the qualities necessary for the understanding to operate, 
awareness is the beginning in the two senses cited above. 
1. Ibid., 14. 
2. Baillie, Hegel's Jhenomenology of Mind, 150. (PROM) 
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ii. Nothing 
But this mere being, as it is mere 
abstraction, is thererore, the absolutely 
negative; which, in a si~ilarly immediate 
aspect, is just nothing.~ 
Nothing, pure Nothing: it is simple 
equality with itselr, complete emptiness, 
without determination or content: un-
difrerentiatedness in itselr.~ 
Because being is thus utterly empty,it 
is thererore equivalent to nothing. The 
thought or nothing is simply the thought 
of the absence of all determination. 
When we think of anything we can only think 
it by virtue or its having this or that 
determination, size, shape, color, weight, 
etc. What has no determination of any 
kind is an absolute emptiness, nothing. 
And because being is by its very derinition 
the absence of all determination, it is 
nothing.3 
On the basis of the interpretation given these 
passages, we become aware that we are aware, or we become 
conscious that we are conscious. But our awareness 
is only awareness or our being aware, or our conscious-
ness is only conscmousness or our being conscious. So 
we are aware of being aware of nothing in particular, 
i.e., no color, no shape, no weight, no object. We cannot 
even call our own awareness or our own consciousness an 
object, since such awareness lacks both content and form. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 161. 
2. Johnston and Struthers, Hegel's Science of Logic, I, 94. 
(SOL) 
3. Stace, POH, 135. 
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Consider the following. If immediate awareness as 
described above is the subject of Hegel(f s discussion, then 
what is under consideration here is immediate awareness 
aware only of itself. An absolute indefiniteness with 
the potentiality for assuming formed content suddenly 
becomes aware of itself as an absolute indefiniteness. 
Such is the first step toward the assuming of formed content, 
but as a first step it is very shallow indeed. For, all 
that conscious absolute indefiniteness has done is to 
become aware of its own lack of character. 
If Aristotle's first matter suddenly assumed the 
form of itself, it would assume no form at all, since as 
first matter, it has no form. 
If Bowne's pure being suddenly became aware of it-
self, it would be aware of nothing since pure being is 
neither causal nor active. For anything to be something, 
it must be causal and active. Not anything is neither 
causal nor active. 
Hegel's Being does become aware of itself, but 
since it has, to begin with, neither form nor content, 
the awareness of such an absence is the awareness of 
nothing at all. To have neither is to be not anything, 
i.e., nothing. Hence when Being becomes aware of itself, 
it is nothing. 
14 
The movement from Being to Nothing can have no real 
effieient cause. Nothing can have forced Being to pass 
to Nothing, since there was literally no thing to precipitate 
the movement. Being is absolute indefiniteness and as 
such is no thing. 
However, this movement can be attributed to the 
potentiality of Being for assuming formed content. How 
this occurs is a mystery to this author; but it is in-
teresting to note that Hegel describes self consciousness 
as 11the state of desire in genera:+ .• "~ If self conscious-
ness is the state of desire in general, then the potentiality 
of being able to assume formed content can be called desire. 
Hence the movement from Being to Nothing is not a logical 
process, but a process prompted by the empirical fact of 
that desire. For to call self consciousness the state 
of desire in general suggests that consciousness, that 
state prior to self consciousness, is also desire, but 
desire which is not aware of itself as desire. 
However, since Hegel's statement appears in the 
Phenomenology of Mind, Nothing cannot be characterized 
as desire. For, one of the limitations imposed on this 
thesis was that no material from the Phenomenology of Mind 
be used as the source of analysis. However, such material 
can be used as illustrative material. For such a purpose 
doe:'' Hegel 1 s statement and the comments above appear. 
1. Baillie, PHOM, 220. 
15 
iii. Becoming 
Nothing, if it be thus bnmediate and 
equal to itself, is also conversely the 
same as Being is. The truth of Being and 
of Nothing is accordingly the unity £f 
the two: and thms unity is Becoming. 
Pure Being, and Pure Nothing are, then, 
the same; the truth is, not either Being 
or Nothing, but that Being --not passes 
but has passed over into Nothing and 
Nothing into Being.2 
Becoming is the concrete unity of 
being and nothing. It is a unity because 
it involves their identity. The dis-
tinction between them has vanished in 
the identity. ••• But the unity is 
concrete because it still contains the 
difference preserved within it.3 
On the basis of the interpretation given these 
passages, we are aware of nothing in particular. 
such a situation. no thing in particular emerges. 
In 
w--
e 
then have a choice. We can return to Being which is 
simple and immediate awareness, or we can remain at 
Nothing, which is awareness of simple and immediate 
awareness. But the result is the same. In either case, 
we are a aware of no thing and no thing emerges from our 
awareness. Both are the same in that either means aware-
ness of nothing in particular. But the second is different 
from the first since in the second we are at least av1are 
that we are aware of nothing. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 165. 
2. Johnston and Struthers, SOL, I, 95. 
3. Stace, POH, 137. 
16 
Since our choice is no choice at all, to be aware 
or something in particular must emerge. The process 
by which we become aware of something in particular is 
called Becoming and is the foundation of the categories 
to follow in the Sein book. 
Notice that in Becoming, we are no longer aware that 
we are aware of nothing in particular. Nor are we aware 
of our awareness of something in particular. Self aware-
ness is submerged for the moment as our awareness of the 
object becomes more articulate. 
Consider the fol~owing. If Nothing is the state 
of self conscious desire in general and Becoming is the 
process by which Belbng, absolute indefiniteness, assumes 
formed content, then Becoming is not necessarily aware of 
its own activity. If an individual is just aware, then 
becomes aware of nothing in particular, he will seek to 
be aware of something in particular. As he builds the 
objects of his consciousness, he may or may not be 
17 
self aware, that is, aware of the way in which the construction 
of objects is being carried out. 
For Hegel, self awareness is lost once there is 
recognition that we must be aware of something in particular. 
For, the next category after Becoming is Sein become 
determinate, that is, Dasein, Being then and there. 
If an individual is aware of qualities at this level, 
it is difficult to see how he can be aware also of his 
awareness of the qualities of an object. It is not an 
easy task to devote some of his attention to his attending 
to the qualities of the ob ject when he fixes his attention 
on the qualities of the object. 
Furthermore, Hegel characterizes Becoming not only 
as the unity of Being and Nothing, but also as Determinate 
Being. 
Becoming then, taken as transition into the 
unity of Being and Nothing, which exists be-
cause it is or has the form of, the one sided 
immediate unity of these moments, is Determinate 
Being.l 
If such an intimate relation does exist between Becoming 
and Dasein, then at Dasein self awareness is not present; 
at Becoming, self awareness becomes submerged. 
1..,1 
As in the Hovement from Being to Nothing, so too 
in the movement from Nothing to Becoming, no logical 
necessity forces such transitions. The necessity is 
empirical and is provided by the need in the case of 
Nothing to Becoming to make intelligible the object and 
the various stages by which an individual comes to be 
aware of the object. 
1. Johnston and Struthers, SOL, I, 120. 
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2. The First Three Categories of Wesen 
i. Identity 
The essence lights up in itself or 
is mere reflection: and therefore is only 
self relation, not as immediate but as 
reflected. An~ that reflex relation is 
self identity. 
In the same way, Identity, as self-
consciousness, is what distinguishes man 
from nature, particularly from the brutes 
which never reach the point of comprehending 
themselves as •I•, that is, pure self-
contained unity.2 
Essence is only essence by virtue of 
its relation to appearance. But the 
appearance is the essence. Therefore, 
the relation of the essence to the 
appearance is only the relation of the 
essence to itself. Hence, essence is 
only essence by virtue of its self 
relatedness. Essence therefore is self 
relation and self relation is identity. 
To be self related is to be self identic~l.3 
On the basis of the analysis given these passages, 
the subject of Hegel's discussion is an individual's 
awareness of an object in its articulate form. Notice 
that he is aware of two things: (1) an object in its 
articulate for.m; (2) his awareness of that object in its 
articulate form.. In the recognition of this situation 
lies the clue to identity, difference and ground. 
Hege~ is de~ing here with ideas, not objects, 
1. Wallace, LOH, 212. 
2. Ibid., 21,5. 
3. Stace, POH, 183. 
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and is preparing for the growth of the idea just as in 
~ he prepared the foundations for the development of 
the object. 
An individual is aware of this object. Thi;s is what 
Hegel calls i dentity. The. object is the object or, to be 
more precise, his awareness of the object is his awareness 
of the object. This does not change for any alteration 
in it would result in his loss of his awareness of his 
awareness of the object. Such a loss would :rrevent the 
movement to idea, by halting the movement to difference. 
Consider the following. An individual is aware 
only of an object with its qualities. These qualities 
include its color, its weight, its size, its shape, etc. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to distinguish between the 
object and its qualities. These are what the more 
technical epistemologist would call sense data., although 
He galL does not re·strict his discussion to the data of 
sense alone. 
These sense data, although qualities, possess a 
quality of their oml. Thi;s is the quality o:f being either 
refractory or non-refractory. Some sense data appear 
regularly and cannot be dismissed by an act of wilL. 
Other sense data appe~r irregularly and can be dismissed 
by an act of will. An example o:f the :first type is the 
rigidness o:f the closed door through which one may try 
to walk. An example of the second type are the mnall 
20 
white spots appearing before one's eyes which can be 
attributed to the passage of white blood corpuscles along 
the retina. 
If sense data did not possess this character of 
being either refractory or non-refractory, then an in-
dividual would never develop the idea of an object. That 
this is the case will be shown in the next section. For 
the present, to be aware of sense data possessing the 
character of being either refractory or non-refractory 
is what Hegel means by identity. 
ii~ Difference 
Essence is mere identity and reflection 
in itself only ~s it is self relating 
negativity, and in that way self repulsion. 
It contains therefore essentially the 
characteristics of Difference.l 
The deduction of difference from identity 
is accomplished as follows. Identity is 
the relation of essence to itself. But 
in thus relating itself to itself it 
thereby distinguishes itself from it-
self. The self relation is; a negative 
self relation, i.e., the self negates 
and repels itself from itself. A relation 
implies at ~east tv~ terms between which 
the relation subsists. In the present 
case the term relates itself to itself. 
The first "itself" which is related is 
different from the second "itself" to 
-which it is related. If there were not 
this inner distinction, then there would 
be no relation.2 
1. Wallace, POH, 215. 
2. Stace, POH, 184-185. 
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The relation of which Stace speaks is the relation 
between the awareness of an object and the awareness of 
the awareness of that object. The awareness of the object 
is identity. The awareness of the awareness of the object 
is difference. 
For, just as in the Sein book where we started 
with awareness and moved to self awareness, so too in 
the Wesen book we st~rt with the awareness of the object 
and move to the av1arene ss of the awareness of that object. 
Both states are mutually dependent, for without identity 
there could be no difference and without difference there 
could be no identity. To be aware only of an object takes 
us to the end of the Sein book and to be aware of no 
particular object takes us to the beginning of the Sein 
book. 
Consider the following. As an individual becomes 
able to distinguish between those data of consciousness 
whi~ are refractory and those which are not, he also 
becomes aware that he is aware of those similarities 
and differences in the character of the data. The reason 
far his becoming self aware is not clear to this author, 
just as the reason for his becoming self aware in the 
~ book was not clear. 
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However, using Hegel's statement from the Phenomenology 
of Nind under the, limitations of this thesis, it can 
be said that desire prompts the movement to self awareness. 
To say that these two states of awareness are 
mutually dependent is to say that both are necessary 
if an individual is to form the idea of an object. If 
he is aware only of the data of consciousness, he would 
find himself not in Wesen but at Real Measure in Sein. 
If he did not become aware of his awareness of the 
refractory character of the data, then objective 
reference is impossible. This will be shown in the 
next section. 
At this point, nevertheless, difference to Hegel 
means the awareness of the awareness of the refractory 
character of the data of consciousness. 
Again, the necessity for moving to an affirmation 
of identity in difference is not logical. It is 
epistemically necessary if we are to develop the idea. 
Such necessity is empirical and is either desire or 
the need to make the object more intelligible. 
1i1. The Ground 
The Ground is the unity of identity in 
difference, the truth of ~at difference 
and identity hsve turned out to be, --
the reflection into self, ~mich is equally 
a reflection into-an-other and vice-versa. 1 It is essence put explicitly as a totality. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 2~. 
\ __ 2_3 __ , 
Each is the same thing, namely, absolute 
dependence on the other. This absolute 
dependence on the other is the idea of 
the Ground. Because the negative depends 
wholly on the positive, therefore the 
positive is the ground of the negative. 
Similarly, the negative is the ground of 
the pesitive. Each, t herefore, is equally 
the ground. The dis tdnction between them 
collapses. And their identity is ground.2 
Here Hegel is ~eparing for the emergence of the 
idea of an object in its articulate form. In Sein, he 
was preparing fat' the Emergence of the object in its artic-
ulate farm the prerequisite for which was the constant 
interplay be tween our simple and immediate awareness 
which is, Being and our awareness of our simple and immediate 
awareness which is Nothing. That interpl~y is Becoming. 
In Wesen, the prerequisite for the e~rgence of the _idea 
of an object in its articulate for.m is the constant 
interplay between our awareness of an object, that is, 
identity, and our awareness of our awareness of an object, 
that is, diffe renee. Hence, thLs interplay is the ground 
for without such an interplay we could not arrive at the 
idea of an object. For, to arrive at the idea of an object 
requires not only that we be aware of the object but also 
that we know that we are aware of the object. Without 
this lmowl~dge of our perceiving the object., we cannot 
distinguish between ourselves and the object. SuCh § 
distinction is necessary in order 
1. Stace, POH, 189. 
ror us to assert anything intelligible about the object, 
~or without such a distinction there would be no object 
at all: only our awareness of the object which, after all, 
belongs to us and not to the object. 
Thia process requires identity, that ~, the aware-
ness o~ the refractory character o~ the data. It requires 
as well difference, that is, the awareness of the aware-
ness of the refractory character of the data. When these 
two stages are interrelated, the individual seeks to 
explain why some data are refractory while others are not. 
Although the data belong to the individual as the content 
of his experience, he is driven to the conclusion that the 
refractor,r c~aracter of the data must be caused by some-
thing other than himself since such data cannot be controlled 
by him. He then postulates something other than himself 
to account for his lack or control over the data. This 
postulation is objective reference. 
Further, in this act of postulation, the idea is 
born. For the data, themselves, cannot refer since they 
are only qualiti~s. We must construct something which 
does re~er; the result o~ such construction is not the 
quality of an object, but the idea of an object. 
For example, if the character, red, app,ears to an 
individual in a regular sequence and he is unable to 
dismiss such a quality and its regularity from his 
experience, then he is forced to conclude that something 
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which does not belong to h~ is causing this regular and 
refractory sequence of red. But the datum, red~ cannot 
refer. It is only a content of his experience. As 
content, it only occurs. An idea, however, even though 
it is a content of his experience, refers to something 
other than itself. Where the datum only occurs, the idea 
both occurs and refers. It is this function of referring 
which distinguishes an idea from a datum. 
The individual then concentrates on the referring 
function of the idea rather than on its occurrence as a 
content of his experience. Such selection leads him to 
forget for the moment that he has been self aware for self.· 
awareness at this level leads him to consider the idea 
as occurring rather than referring. Such consideration 
destroys objective reference. 
Therefore, when we arrive at the first category 
after the ground, namely, existence, we are no longer 
aware of ·our awareness of· the object. We are only 
aware of t h e idea of the object ~nd aware of that ob-
ject. This situation is similar to t h e one in the Sein 
book, where, once aware of Dasein, we are aware only of 
something in particul~r and not aware of our awareness 
of nothing in particular. 
Notice also as in the Sein book, although self 
awareness is submerged~ to be submerged is not to be 
non-operative. We have only to be reminded of that 
famous lower three-quarters of the Freudian iceberg, 
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namely, the id, to cont'irm that suspicion. For, just as 
self awareness reappeared at the beginning of the Wesen 
book, we should look for it to reappear in a richer for.m 
at the beginning of the Begriff book. 
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3. The Fir~t Three Categories of Begriff 
i. The Universal 
Universality, particularity and in-
dividuality are, taken in the abstract, 
the same as identity, difference and 
grou.nd.l 
It is, first, simple self relation: 
it is in itself only. But secondly, this 
identity is in itself absolute mediation, 
though it is not a mediated entity. That 
universal which is a mediated universal, 
because abstract and opposed )o the particular 
will not be discus~ed until the Determinate 
Notion is reached. 
The Notion is the identity of opposites. 
Since its opposite is immediately identical 
with itself, it is, therefore, absolute 
identity. This unity or identity is the 
universal. ••• It is not only identical 
with itself in itself. It is also identical 
with itself in its opposite. It is thus 
a concTete unity.3 
On the ba~is of the interpretation given these 
passages, the subject of Hegel's discussion is an 
individual's awareness of the idea in its articulate 
form. This is analagous to his awareness of the 
object in its articulate form at the beginning of the 
Wesen book and to awareness s~ple and ~ediate at the 
beginning of the Sein book. All three, in their proper 
stage, are self identical. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 294. 
2. Johnston and Struthers, SOL, II, 236. 
3. Stace, POH, 227. 
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Awarenees is awareness, awareness of the object is aware-
ness of the object and awareness of the idea of the ob-
ject is awareness of the idea of the object. Thus, each 
is identity, but the last is more rich than the first 
and second since the last contains both the first and 
second. 
Consider the following. If a scientist has under-
gone the phenomenological development described in these 
pages, in Wesen he would have access not only to the 
conceptual system Which serves as the means by ~ich 
predictions are made, but also to his own sense data 
which serve as the means by which predictions are con-
futed or refuted. As he enters the Begr.iff stage, the 
sense data are forgotten, for. the moment, as concentration 
is centered upon the conceptual system. This is awareness 
of a rather more complex universal than someone•s idea 
of a circle or a stone. But the importance of the aware-
ness of the idea alone is that, even though they do occur 
within his experience, the sense data which serve as the 
foundatio• of his science are n.ot correlated with the 
conceptual system which is his too·l for ordering and 
relating these data. Rather, the conceptual system alone 
is taken as the real object. 
Therefore, the ~ediate awareaess of the idea of 
a~ object is the universal, since to treat this idea as 
if it were the real object is to be aware only of the idea 
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of the object and hence to ignore the difference which 
exists between sensuous instantiations of the universal. 
ii. The Particular 
Determinateness as such belongs to 
Being and to the ~alitative; as determinateness 
of the Notion, it is particularity. It 
is not a limit: it is not related to any 
Other ~s beyond; but, as has just been 
seen, it is the peculiar immanent move-
ment of the universal, which latter, 
therefore, in P~rticularity is ~ot with 
an Other, but just with itsel~. 
Since the Notion opposes itself to 
itself, it thereby negates itsel~, deter-
mines itself. This element o~ negativity 
determinateness is difference, particularity. 
It is the differentia 'Which determines 
the genus (universal). This gives us the 
particular. Tha Not ion is the identity 
of opposites. The factor of identity is 
the universal. The factor of opposition 
is the particular.2 
On the basis of the analysis given these ~- ssages, 
the subject of Hegel's discussion is an individual's 
awareness of his awareness of the idea in its articulate 
form. This double awareness is analogous to his ~wareness 
of his awareness of the object in its articulate form 
at the beginning of the Wesen book and to his awareness 
of his. awareness simple and ~ediate at the beginning 
of the ;;;)ein book. All three, in their proper stage, 
are difference. He is not only just aware, 
1. Johnston and Struthers, SOL, II, 239-240. 
2. Stace, POH, 227-228. 
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but is aware of being aware; he is not only just aware 
of the object but also aware of his being aware of the 
object; he is not only aware of the idea of the object 
· but also aware of his being aware of the idea of the 
object. Thus each is difference, but the last is more 
rich than the first and second since the last contains 
both the first and second. 
Consider the following. If the scientist described 
in the last section were to become aware of his awareness 
of the idea of an object, he would be aware, for 
example, of the formula, f equals ma, not as a group of 
symbols describing an infinite number of observations 
as he would in wesen, or as a group of symbols describing 
the for.mal structure of reality as he would at the universal 
in Begriff •• Rather, he is aware of f equals ma as an event 
in his own experience. In such ~ case, the scientist 
forgets that these four symbols stand for the observations 
they describe and PI" edict, and also th~t these four symbols 
can ba interpt"eted to reveal a formal relation .inherent 
in the structure of reality. He knGTs only that f equals ma 
is an event in his own experience, ~n event very much like 
the sense data which g~ve rise to this idea, in that both 
are events in his experience W.ich, at this point, only 
occur but do not refer. 
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In this case, he tends to associate the idea as event 
with the sense datum as event which gave rise to the 
idea. 
Therefore, the idea regarded as the awareness of 
the awareness of the idea is the particular, since to be 
aware of the awareness of any universal is to treat 
the universcal as an object within experience and hEnce 
to ignore the similarities displayed by different ideas 
of the same object. 
iii. The Individual 
The third is Individuality--meaning 
the reflection-into-self of the specific 
characters of universality and particularity; 
--which negates self unity has complete 
and original determinateness, without 
any loss to its self-identity and universality.1 
But individuality is not only the 
return of the Notion into itself; it is 
also ~mediately its loss. In individuality 
it is in itsel:f'; and because of t.lle manner 
in which it is in itself', it becomes 
external to itself and enters into actuality.2 
The Notion thus goes into oppos~i tion 
to itself and this opposition is partic-
ularity. But its opposite is only itself. 
This identity of its opposite with itself 
constitutes the neg at ion of the negation, 
and as the return of the Notion into itself. 
••• This return into itself' of the Notion 
is therefore the unity of the universal 
and the particular, or it is the identity 
of identity and dif'ference, i.e., it is 
the; singul~r or individual.) 
1. Wallace, LOH, 228. 
2. Johnston and Struthers, SOL, II, 255. 
3. Stace, POH, 291. 
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On the basis of the analysis given these passages, 
the subject of Hegel's discussion is the constant inter-
play between an individual's awareness of the idea 
and his awareness of his awareness of the idea. This 
~ interplay is analegous to the interplay between his 
awareness of the object and his awareness of his aware-
ness of the object Which lea to ground in the Wesen 
book, and to the interplay between his awareness sfmple 
and immediate and his awareness of his awareness simple 
and immediate in the Sein book. All three, in their 
proper stage, ire identity in difference, but the 
last is more rich than the first and second since the 
last contains both the first and second. Thus the inter-
play between his awareness of the idea and his awareness 
of his awareness of the idea is the individual since to 
regard an idea not only as a universal but also as 
an event within experience is to recognize that the 
universal can give not the innumerable differences between 
its instantiations but only the point of exact identity 
between those immumerable instantiations. This leads 
h~ to look not at the universal as reality, nor the 
event in experience as reality, but rather that which 
will account for both the universal and the particular, 
namely, the individual. The universal refers to similarities. 
The particular records differences. The individual 1.s 
both universal and particular and hence is the unity of 
the two. 
There is one important difference between all the 
stages discussed and this one. When we move on to the 
next category, there is no loss of the awareness of the 
awareness of the idea as there was a loss of the aware-
ness of the awareness of the object at existence and a 
loss of the awareness of awareness simple and 1mrre diate 
at Dasein. This ends a possible infinmte regress, for 
if there were a loss of awareness of awareness of the 
idea as we moved on to the next category, we could ask, 
at the end of Begriff, to continue the process. But the 
Notion is the end of the process since the notion is 
the return of itself into itself, from Which nothing 
more can emerge. There is no more self submersion 
since there is nothing more to be submerged. The 
Notion is self-explanatory since at the end of Begriff 
we arrive at the "Logical Idea 11 , for our awareness of 
our awareness of the idea as it develops is the 
Logical Ide8 in its individuality. Such a concept 
explains itself by being itselr.1 
1. The nature ,:,of the notion will be described and explained 
in the next chapter. 
4. Analytic Objections to Hegel 
i. Introduction 
It might be helpful before considering analytic 
object ons to Hegel's logic to examine the fundamental 
concep s of analytic philosophy, itself. 
All statements can be divided, unlike Gaul, into 
two cl sses, the meaningful and the meaningless. The 
former class includes two kinds of statements, namely, 
the a and the synthetic. Analytic statements are 
those tatements Which are true or false by virtue of what 
of 
of 
fact. 
reference to any matters of fact. Analytic 
divided into three classes. The first 
tautologies. The second includes axioms 
axiomatic-deductive system or theorems 
The third includes self-contradictions. 
the other hand, synthetic statements are more 
true by virtue of their reference to matters of 
synthetic statement is easily detected since 
nly it should satisfy the requirements of the 
ility criterion as outlined by Ayer. 
I propose to say that a statement is 
irectly verifiable if it is either itself 
observation statement, or is such that 
n conjunction with one or more observation 
tatements it entails at least one obser-
a tion sta-tement which is not deducible from 
hese other premises alone; and I propose 
o say that a staternoont is indirectly verifiable 
f it satisfias the following conditions: 
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first that in conjunction with certain 
other premises it entails one or more 
directly verifiable statements Which are 
not deducible from these otl~r premises; 
and secondly that these other premise3 
do not include any statement that is not 
either analytic, or directly verifiable, 
or capable of being independently established 
as indisectly verifiable •••• requiring 
of a literally meaningful statement, Which 
is not analytic, that it should be1either directly or indirectly verifiable. · 
Both analytic and synthetic statements exhaust 
the class of meaning~l statements. Hence tnese 
statements comprise what is called knowledge. All 
other statements, that is, those Which do not satisfy 
the requirements of the verifiability criterioR, those 
which are neither simple tautologies nor self-contradictions, 
those which are neither axioms nor theorems of a consistent 
axiomatic-deductive system are meaningless and not 
included in the class of statements honored by the 
title, knowledge. 
Therefore, for any philosophy to be meaningful 
entails its using as the content of study only meaningful 
statements. The only meaningful philosophy, then, is 
either the philosophy of science or the philosophy of 
logic and mathematics, since all synthetic statements 
are statements in some science and all anal1tic statements 
are statements in logic and mathematics. 
1. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logie, 60. (LTT) 
'----" 
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However, :act all syathetic stateme:ats are observatio• 
statememts. If all statements i• science are synthetic, 
then statemeAts which refer to unobservable entities 
such as electrons or the property of solubility must be 
s,rathetio as well. Such entities or statements refer.r!Bg 
to these ent,ties are co•struetions from observatioD 
statemeats or observable predicates along t&e liBes pro-
posed by Carnap.1 To construct ~ese entities is to 
include them ia am axiomatie-deduetive system such that 
b 
observatiom statements or o~servatioa predicates appear AF . 
as axioms or primitive terms of the system aad statemeats 
referring to unobservable entities are theorems of the 
system. Ia this manner both observation statements 
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and constructions from observation statements are synthetic. 
ii. The Unity of Being 8Jld Nothi».g 
The propositio:D., the unity of being and aothing is 
becominc, is a meaningless propositio:m.. Beift& al'l.d nothiq 
cannot be used as substantival terms. First of all, the 
propositioa has tae illusory fora of a correct grammatical 
state.ment such as tl!l.e unity of man and woman is famil7 
or th.e lll!lity of state ad state is natioJl. For, these 
last two meaniagful statements use terms which refer to 
a discrete eatity directly observable through sensory 
inspectiom or eonstructable from sensory observations. 
1. Carnap, Testability aad Meaning. 
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The terms, being, nothing and becoming can neither be 
observed through direct sensory inspection nor constructed 
from sensory observations. Therefore, since these terms 
do not satisfy the requirements of the verifiability 
criterion as outlined by Ayer, the sta.tements referring 
to them are literally meaningless. 
Further, there is the problem of asserting that 
being exists and non-being exists, that is, the problem 
of using existence as a predicate. Thia is a pPactice 
condemned by philosophers from Kant to Ayer. 
But as Kant pointe,d out, existence 
is not an attribute. For When we ascribe 
an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert 
that it exists: so that if existence 
were itself an attribute, it would follow 
that alE positive existential sentences 
were tautologies and all neg ative existential 
sentences were self-contradictory; and 
this is not the case. So that those 
who raise questions about Being whiCh are 
based on the assumption that existence 
is an attribute are guilty of f'ollGl in~ 
grammar beyond the boundaries of' sense. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the unity of' 
being and nothing is a literally meaningless statement 
since the statement does not fulfill the require:rmnts 
of' the verifiability criterion nor can either being or 
nothing be ~ sensuously observed or constructed from 
sensuous observation, nor can existence be us,ed ~s a 
predicate. 
1. Ayer, LTL, 43. 
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iii. Identity and Di££ereace tn Wesen and Begri££ 
The problem raised by the unity o£ two contraries 
such as those discussed in the last section and. the 
problem of identity in differe~ce is essentially the 
same. 
In Qu1De 1 s system, the law of identity is disclosed 
as a de£~it1on of the Universal Class, that is, the 
symbol for the universal class stands for the class of 
all elements ~hat equal themselves. Since everything 
equals itself, everything is a mamber of the universal 
class.l 
Therefore, to say that A is B is not to say that 
A equals B, since that is to assert that A and B are names 
£or the same individual or class, be it sensuously observed, 
a constructioa from sensuous observation or purely 
definitional. To say that A ia B, that is, to predicate 
the property B of A, is to assume that A is equal to itself. 
It is not to say that there is some external or internal 
relation between A and its property B. It is to say that 
whatever A is, it ~y enjoy membership in many di£fereat 
classes by virtue of what it, itself, is. For example, 
John is wise---that is to say, John is himself and is a 
member of the class of wise men by virtue of what he is, 
not by virtue of a property Which is imposed upon him from 
within or without to change him into what he is not. 
1. Quine, Mathematical Logic, 144. 
He may be a student, a father and a positivist, but each 
of these attributes uniquely determines a class to 'Which 
John belongs because he is, irrevocably, himself a:q.d not 
somebody or something else. If ke were not equal to 
himself, he would be a member of the Nul1 Class lilich has 
no members. Hence the name, John, would name literally 
nothing at all or at the very least a class with no mem-
bers, namely, the empty class. Thus the opposition 
between identity and difference and the unity of the two 
is absurd. It was derived from obscure grammatical 
const~ctions arid a lack of logical acumen. 
iv. The Problem of Conceptions of Philosophy 
Two different· conceptions of philosophy are at work, 
one in Hegel and the other in the analytic objections to 
Hegel. For Hegel does not restrict himself only to the 
intelligibility consumated in a logical system and in 
the natural sciences, although such intelligibility is 
achieved in the Wesen section of his logic. Neither is 
the logical empiricist talking about the intelligibility 
consumated in a metaphysical system. Since these two 
notions of intelligibility determine not only the system 
defended but also the interpPetation of the system opp osed, 
both suffer from mutual migunderstanding. To investigate 
in an exact manner the nature of these two notions is part 
of the subject of the next chapters. All that can be said 
here is to recognize these two systems and their most sig-
nificant characteristics. 
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There is in Hegel the constant affirmation of the 
unity of so called opposites leading to greater degrees 
of concreteness, to greater degrees of inclusiveness and 
to what could be termed greater degrees of coherence in 
terms of the coherent organization of all areas of human 
experie nee. 
There is in analytic thought the constant affirmation 
of the loglcal structure of analytic st~tements giving 
meaning to these very statements and of the fact that 
synthetic statements must refer to sensuously observed 
objects or to constructions from sensuously observed 
objects -- $n obvious restriction on the wideness of human 
experience to be explained. There is also an affirmation 
of a correspondence criterion of truth in the verifiability 
criterion and a coherence criterion subordinate to the 
former. 
The most significant difference is that in analytic 
philosophy ~ structure of explanation need not explain 
itself. But in Hegel the importance of his structure 
of explanation is that it does explain itself. 
5. Stace 1 s Analysis of Hegel's Logic 
Stace maintains that each category of Hegel's 
logic is logically deduced from its predecessors and 
logically entails its successors. 
A wholly new conception of the nature 
of universals has to be evolved if deduction 
is to be possible~ a conception according 
to Which the universal~ the genus~ contains 
its differentiae and its species within 
itself~ so that they can be extricated 
from it by logical deduction. Such universals 
are called by Hegel concrete universals ••• l 
Such an interpretation seems to involve what 
Stace thinks Hegel means by necessity. 
It will be seen that this entire 
process of categories is a compulsory 
process forced onwards by the compelling 
necessity of reason.2 
The necessity of reason is characterized in the 
following way: 
It suggested that the first principle 
of the world is not a cause of which the 
world is an effect~ but that it is a 
reason of which the world is the consequent.3 
In light of these statements~ Stace contends 
that nothing empirical, that is, no allusion to experience 
can enter as part of the process of the deduction of the 
categories. For, in such a case~ Hegel 1 s logic would 
contain categories where the connection between them is not formal 
1. Stace, POH, 84. 
2. Ibid.' 93. 
3. ~., 53. 
but empirical, not necessary but contingent. 
For example, in Stace 1 s discussion of Hegel's 
actuality in Wesen, he interprets Hegel's "only 
the rational fs actualtt to mean that only those 
conceptions which are necessary are real. Th'at 
this paper is white is a fact which could be other-
wise; hence such as state:roont as rtthis paper is white" 
is contingent and the fact it describes is not real. 
That a plus b equals b plus a is necessary and 
hence the conception, a plus b equals b plus a, is real. 
However, in Stace 1 s discussion of the specific 
quantum, he reveals that Hegel does make what is 
ter100d an "illegitimate appeal to experience."l 
For Hegel assumes the general principle that the 
thesis of any triad must be immediate. Stace asserts 
that there is nothing in many of Hegel's theses 
that entail their immediacy. 
The deduction draws its plausibility 
only from empirical examples, such as the 
change of water into steam.2 
Yet Stace points out that this: type of appeal to 
experience is involved in other so called deductions: 
1. Stace, POH, 172. 
2. ~-
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for example, in the transition from difference to variety;l 
in the transition from the whole to its parts;2 in the 
transition from the notion to the judgm.ent;3 in the . 
transition from the affirmative to the negative judgment;4 
in the transition from the qualitative judgment to the 
syllogism of reflection;5 in the transition from the 
categorical syllogism to the hypothetical syllogism;6 
in the transition from mechanigm to chemism;7 in the 
transition from the living individual to the life 
process;8 etc •• 
In his discussion of the Philosophy of Nature, 
Stace comments that this illegitimate appeal to 
experience involves Hegel in invalid deductions, of which 
all that can be said by the most hopeful 
Hegelians is that possibly Hegel's trans-
ition affords a clue to the truth which 
some subsequent thinker may follow up 
to find a valid deduction.9 
1. Stace, POH, 185. 
2. ~., 204. 
3. Ibid.' 232. 
4. ~., 236. 
5. Ibid., 248-254. 
6. Ibid., 259-260. 
7. Ibid., 267. 
8. Ibid.' 283. 
9. Ibid.' 304-305. 
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It doe's not occur to Stace that Hegel is not 
attempting any deductions, valid or otherwise. These 
appeals to experience which furnish the immediacy of 
a thesis in so many triads may not be part of any 
deduction, but rather part of a description of a 
phenomenological development. The analysis offered 
in this thesis tries to give such an interpretation to 
Hegel's logic. For example, Being, identity and the 
universal are immediate not becaua.e their meaning 
entails their immediacy, but because their occurence is 
immediate in the phenomEDological sens,e. That is, they 
are each awarene sa without the awareness of that 
awareness. In Being, the individual was just aware; 
in identity, the individual was aware only of the object; 
in the universal, the individual was aware only of the 
idea of the object. To assert that these sta@9s are 
immediate is to point to an essential characteristic 
of the experience for Which these categories stand, 
namely, the fact that an individual is not aware of them. 
In the next nhapter, we shall see how far Stace•s 
anslys."is can be carried with reference to Hegel's 
conception of philosophy. It suffices to say at this 
point in light of the analysis offered in tgis 
thesis that Hegel's logic is amenable to a phenomenological 
analysis, an analysis which off ers a reasonable explanation 
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o:r why each thesis in any triad is immediate, an analysis 
which saves Hegel's logic from hopeless inconsistency, 
inconsistency only in light o:r Stace's analysis, by 
pointing out that Hegel was not trying to achieve only 
a logically consistent system. 
Chapter III 
THE REAL IS RATIONAL: AN INTERPRETATION OF HIDEL 1 S LOGIC 
1. Hegel's Conception of Empiricism 
The real is rational and the rational is real 
may be interpreted to have at least three meanings. The 
first of these will now be discussed. 
It is impossible to begin anything absolutely. One 
cannot begin anything without making some assumptions. 
To be sure, the assumptions made by any beginning may be 
quite obvious to the beginner. But it is more likely 
t hat such assumptions are not so obvious. To those 
philosophers who maintain that sense experience is prima 
facie the most reliable source of knowledge about ourselves, 
the external world and whatever worlds happen to lurk 
behind the external world, Hegel replies most carefully. 
First, every beginning makes some assumption. 
We can assume nothing, and assert 
nothing; nor can we accept the assertions 
and assumptions of others. And yet we 
must make a beginning; and a beginning 
as primary and underived, makes an assumption, 
or rather is an assumption. It seems as 
if it w!re impossible to mske a beginning 
at all. 
1. Wallace, LOH, 4. 
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Second, if every beginning makes some assumption, 
or rather, every beginning is an assumption, why, then, 
must we assume more than we have to assume? If some say 
that sense experience alone has evidential value, then 
they must also say that every other ingredient in exper-
ience has less evidential value than sense experience 
and, therefore, has no evidential value at all. 
Such an assertion is too severe a proclamation to 
make at the beginning of any inquiry. For, we have already 
decided, if we assent to it, that sense experience is, 
in fact, a reliable source of knowledge, and that the 
title of reliability does not a~ly to any other area of 
experience. The statement that sense experience has 
evidential value and the implied statement that no other 
area of experience is dignified with this value do not 
entail each other although the second does entail the first. 
This can be readily seen from the fact that the logical 
conjunction of the first statement with the denial of the 
second statement produces no logical contradiction While 
• the logical conjunction of the second statement with the 
denial of the first does produce a logical contradiction. 
Rather than pontificate any such conclusion, Hegel 
merely says that we should not at the beginning of inquiry 
decide whether any of our experiences has mare evidential 
value than others. Not only should we not do so, but 
we cannot do so for we have no basis upon which to 
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build such a decision. We have, as yet, discovered no 
criterion which allows us to decide. As a matter of fact, 
if we do assert the prima facie superiority of sensory 
experience, we assert not only this superiority but also 
the prima faci6 superiority of sensory verification as 
our criterion of truth. If what is true enters only 
through the senses, then what is true can be tested only 
through the senses. Therefore, sensory verification is 
our criterion of truth. But we have indeed argued in a 
circle, for our criterion of truth entails the superiority 
of sense experience and sense experience as a superior 
mode of knowing ehtails sensory verification as our 
criterion of truth. Our delight at having revealed 
such a situation is made even more intense When we realize 
that such mutual entailment has resulted not from in-
dependent inquiry concerning both sides, but rather 
from a capricious assumption entailing both sides. 
Therefore, Hegel can say that each ingredient Hithin 
experience has prima facie evidential value at the beg inning 
of inquiry. This is not to say that there must be some 
object to which each ingredient points, since such a con-
clusion should result fro m our inquiry, not from our 
assumptions involving the beginning. Rather, this is 
to say that each ingredient in our experience has ob-
jective reference or at least we should treat each ingredient 
as if it did, until we discover whether the claims made 
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on thel basis o:f objective re:fe.rence are justi:fied. 
I Thus, when Hegel asks what should be the content 
I 
o:r the..l science o:r right, he can answer quite naturally 
that e:veryth ing anybody has included with in its dom.a in 
! 
is the' content o:f such a science. 
I 
The content o:f this science through 
every one o:f its moments; e.g., right, 
property, morality, :family, state, and 
so :forth.l 
I Further, Hegel goes on to say that such is the 
I 
conten~ o:f his science o:f right, that is, whatever anybod~ has included in such a domain up to and 
incluJ ing Hegel. It is quite possible that a:fter 
Hegel h ew content will be added since the ingredients 
o:f hurnkn experience change. Discovery and invention 
I 
may either enrich or make sterile such experience. 
But t 1 e :fact o:f discovery and invention at least 
suggesf s a di:f:ference in the content of that experience. 
1. 
J One word more about giving instructions 
I 
as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy 
in any case always comes on the scene too 
I late to give it. As the thought. o:f the 
I 
world, it appears only when actuality is 
already there cut and dried a:fter its 
I process o:f :formulation has been completed. 
! The teaching o:f the concept, which is 
1 
also history's inescapable lesson, is that 
I the ideal :first appears over against the 
I real and that -the Ideal apprehends 
' I -
POR, 29. 
so 
this same real world in its substance and 
builds it up for itself' into the shape of 
an intellectual rea1m. When philosophy 
paints its grey in grey, then has a shape 
of life grown old. By philosophy's grey 
in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only 
understood. The owl or Minerva spreads 
its wings only with the falling of the dusk.l 
1 Such an answer is natural indeed. To say, for 
exa~le, that the aesthetic experience is a manifestation 
of pt easure, so that ~enever anyone says something is 
beautiful he means he is pleased, is more than just 
an affront to beauty. For 'When someone says something 
is beautiful, he does not mean he is experiencing 
such l and such a visceral sensation or sensations. 
He m~ans that there· is something about the object he 
has call ed beautiful 'Which invites him to characterise 
it a~ such. This is the comme~1sense way of looking 
at experience. 
I Of course, there is no glistening infallibility 
to common sense. Common sense tells us the world is 
flat l But enlightened common sense does not assert 
that I the world is flat, has been flat, and will continue 
to be f~~ . To say only that you are pleased whenever I ~ ~-~ 
you are invited to call any object beautiful is to say 
the ~orld is f~t. For such an assertion denies the 
I possibility that there is some property of an object, 
which is called beauty. To say that the earth is, was 
and will be flat denies the possibility that the earth 
has, l in fact, another shape. Buth conclusions deny not 
1. Knox, POR, 12-13. 
only 'J:;he i·relevance of further evidence but also the 
I 
availf bility of further evidence to either confirm or 
I 
refut¢ their positions. The question for each is closed, 
I 
becau~e, in fact, it has never been opened. 
I 
I 1Thus, Hegel's compelling desire to say something 
I 
about : everything is not as Morton White would have us 
believe evidence for muddledness, but rather evidence 
for h l s · ... desire to treat everything as evidential. 
It is a remarkable tribute to an enormously 
muddled but brilliant German professor of the 
nineteenth century that almost every im-
portant philosophical move1mnt of the 
twentieth century begins with an attack 
on his veiws.l 
Such a desire constitutes the first meaning of 
the real is rational and the rational is real. 
I 
I 
I 
1. 
I White, Age of Analysis, 13. 
2. Hegel's Principle o£ Intelligibility 
The second meaning of the real is rational and 
the l ational is real will now be discussed.· 
Aristotle begins his metaphysics with this sta.te-
ment: l "All men by their very nature feel the urge to 
11 know.1" He goes on to adduce evidence for this by 
noting the delight men take in their senses, memory, 
art, ~he useful and theoretical sciences, and finally 
in wisdom. Not only do all men feel this urge, but 
Hegel does also. For him, the nmne of his urge to 
know ~s the dialectic. The dialectic will put an end to 
the following kind of situation: 
I 
Today we see the stars here, and to-
morrow there; and our mind finds something 
incongruous in this chaos--something 
in which it can put no faith, because it 
believes in order ~nd in a simple, constant 
and universal law. · 
I It is important for Hegel that the dialectic, itsel£, 
I be an ingredient within experience. For the dialectic 
is no~ , technically, a criterion of truth. A criterion 
I 
of truth decides whether any hypothesis is adequate or 
I 
not. JBut aat this stage of analysis, the dialectic is not 
testing hypotheses. It is rather searching for them. 
I 
It may well turn out after the search is completed not 
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 51. 
2. Wallace, LOH, 42. 
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only that the dialectic is the criterion of truth but 
also that it represents the best possible hypothesis 
If the dialectic at this stage of analysis were a 
ion of truth$ then it does not have to be found 
experience. A criterion of truth may be as alien 
erience as the ~priori dismissal of aesthetic 
c en~'s possessing evidential value$ as long as the 
ion does What it is intended to do. For exmnple, 
decide that the answers given by UNIVAC are true 
s and, therefore$ that UNIVAC is our criterion 
of t th. 
But if the dialectic is the name of a very persona1$ 
i.e., existential, urge to know, then to assert that it 
is no to be found within experience is to assert a 
viole t contradiction. For, whatever is personal is 
found within an individual's experience, s~ply because 
this s what we mean when we characterize anything as 
per so at the very least. If the urge to know is 
per so then its source is personal as well. 
if the dialectic is, in fact, searChing 
for a ypothesis representing reality and that hypothesis 
turns out to be the totality of experience, itself, then 
the d alectic, not present in experience, could not be 
calle to perform the tasks appropriated to it, in the 
light hypothesis, since it would lie outi!de the 
Moreover, if the hypothesis to be employed is less than 
the of experience, that is, some part of it, 
and 
that 
real 
which 
dialectic were not present as an ingredient 
ng every experience, it still could not be 
upon to perform any operations, for the very same 
mentioned above. 
calling upon the dialectic will 
in the next section. Until then, we may assert 
second meaning of the rational is real and the 
rational is that the principle of intelligibility 
decide what ingredients of experience have 
or less claim to truth and reality is the 
itself an ingredient pervading that experience. 
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3. Hegel's Conception of Philosophy 
In Chapter II the following analysis of Hegel's 
logic was proposed: first, we experience and become aware 
of that experience, and from this the object emerges; 
second, we are aware of the object and become aware of: 
our awareness of the object, and from this science and 
the idea emerge; third, we are aware of the idea and become 
aware of our awareness of the idea, and from this we 
become completely self aware. The first is the realm of: 
Sein. The second is the realm of: Wesen. The third is 
the realm of Begriff. 
The movement from the Sein level of experience 
to the Wesen leve1 is made through objective reference. 
For, if we discover certain elements in our experience 
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which are both regula» and refractory, these two characteristics 
suggest to us that we do not cause ingredients possessing 
them. Rather, there is something, not ourselves, which 
is the ground of: these experiences.! 
Further, this is also a movement to conceptual 
thought. For, .:..:.· we have escaped the ego-centric pre-
dicament by postulating something not ourselves to accpunt 
for these regular and refractory experiences wit~ 
ourselves. 
1. cl.s. Pierce, "The Principles of Phenomenology. II In 
this essay, Pierce moves from the category of Firstness 
which is essenitally Hegel's Sein to the categor~ of: 
Secon!dness 'Which is essentially Hegel's Wesen thJ:tougb. 
the mechanism mentioned above. 
Moreover, we have created ourselves in so postulating. 
We must now describe this not-self and the most ready 
tool for description is conceptual thought. Now that 
we discover something not ourselves which has some 
control over us, we feel fear or dread over not being 
able to control this not-self. 
There are many ways to control, but the easiest 
of these is to avoid what is harmful to us and take 
advalltage of what is useful to us. Therefore, the 
c 
means far control :tie in prediction, and coneptual 
A 
thought serves ~ediction well. 
In order to serve prediction well, conceptual 
thought must obey those rules which maintain its 
integrity 1 namely 1 the laws of id en t:t.. ty, non-e ontradiction 
and excluded middle. But these laws have a peculiar 
effect on our experience_. We discover that we DDlSt 
abstract from those ref rae tory and regular experiences 
certain elements in order to ~eserve the integrity of 
our t 'ool. For, conceptual thought demsnds that each. 
concept be logically independent of every other concef)t. 
An example of such independence is to be found within 
the number system where each number fills its appointed 
position and does not move for fear of de stroying the 
systek, it self. Thus, we discover only diversity with ill. 
! 
any oonceptual system, and never unity. We also discover 
no ~ocess within this system unless it be of the type 
illustrated by the real number system where an infinite 
collection of real numbers falls between each real number. 
But such infinity does not allow process since infinity 
in such a case cannot be traversed. 
But our urge to know will not rest in diversity, 
since it has already been presented with unity in the realm 
of Sein experience. To be aware and to forget that you 
have been aware is to use no conceptual system as a tool, 
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for there is nothing to predict. All there is: in such a 
situation is the rich content of experience where no distinctions 
have been made between the differing areas of experience, 
since there is nothing with which to make this distinction. 
Our urge to know clings to the idea of unity it 
remembers before the self distinguished itself from the 
not-self. Perhaps, the possibility of the urge remembering 
this unity is the reason why, if the Logic is taken as 
a phenomenological description of the way in which we 
come to know, many stages of the Sein book cannot be 
discovered in any phenomenological analysis.l Their 
content is already part of memory and we do not 
experience with part of self, but with all of it. 
Consequently, in the attempt to re-experience these 
stages, memory would participate. But memory 
I 
1. I~ has been pointed out that existential psychoanalysis 
recovers some of these stages. Cf.also the !!!negative 
in Paton, The Modern Predicament, Chapter 6. 
already includes the contents of these stages and so 
any re~experience would be an experience including the 
contents of memory. Therefore, a re-experience must 
r 
be a different experience. In that case, no re-experience 
is pos[sible since process would be denied. 
If unity is presented in ~ and diversity in 
I Wesen, but the unity in ~ is not amenable to con-
ceptual thought and the diversity in Wesen has no real 
unity; and if the urge to lmow wilJJ. not rest in either 
the unity of ~ or the diversity of Wesen, then we have 
two alternatives open to us. We can either give up the 
search altogether since conceptual thought will not sufflice 
~ logical positivism and no thought is available in 
Wesen through mystical union by ~ negativa, or we 
may seek another mode of explanation. 
The last alternative is Hegel's decision. He is 
looking for an analogy which, if taken to be the structure 
of rea~ity, will preserve the unity of ~and the 
diversity of Wesen. 
Such an analogy is available when we move from 
We sen to Begriff. The movement results when we become 
completely self aware. This is achieved as we come to 
realize that no matter how strong is our belief in the 
existence of something other than self to account for 
the refractory and regular character of our experience, 
we do, in fact, experience only within ourselves. We 
are justified in escaping the ego-centric predicament 
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but we cannot escape the experiento-predicament. No 
i 
matter how strong the ~eeling o~ objective re~erence 
may be, we are re~erring, and it is not something 
outside ourselves which is doing the re~erring. 
This is Hegel's great insight, ~ar it may well 
turn out that experie nee at this level can, i~ taken as 
the structure o~ reality, provide the kind o~ unity 
and kind o~ diversity desired by the urge to know. 
Sine~ this level, as the synthesis o~ Sein and flesen, 
I 
is bQth. unity and diversity in its concreteness as ex-
1 
pres~ed by a living human being, it is described in the 
I ~ollowing way: 
Form in its most concrete signi~ication 
1 is reason as speculative knowing, and con-
tent is reason as the substantial essence 
1 o~ actuality, whether ethical or natUt'al. 
The known identity o~ these two is the 
Philosophical Idea.l 
I This is what we mean men we say that reality is 
I 
mind. We do not roo an that the paper upon which this 
thesis is written is a piece o~ thought, on the Wesen 
I 
level, that is, on the level o~ scientUic inquiry. 
We do not seek to describe this paper ~or the purpose 
o~ predicting what will. happen to it as the conditions 
under which it appears change. Rather, we mean on the 
Begriif~ level that the most intelligible account we c.sn 
I give which will preserve the unity o~ this paper as well 
I 
I 
1. Knox, POR, 12. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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as the diversity it displays @S the conditions change 
under which it appears, is to say that it is a member 
of a self differentiating system Which is the nature 
of experience on the Begriff level, that is, it is mind. 
I 
The notion is, on the contrary, the 
principle of all life, and thus possesses 
at the same time a character of thorough 
concreteness. 
For, it is only on this level that we achieve 
genuine identity-in-difference. The self identity of 
the self provides the identity, while the activity of 
the seU.f in expressing its nature provides the diversity. 
It is here also that we achieve genuine freedom, for here 
we have a self determining agency. It is here that we 
achieve genuine necessity, for we have a self determining 
I 
agency which can do nothing more than express its own 
nature. Perhaps this is the only concrete example of 
freedo~, unless we include the necessity of logical 
form. But such logical necessity is an abstraction 
I 
from the total context of experience. 
I we cah now see why it was so ~portant to have 
the dialectic as an ingredient pervading all experience 
and not something outside experience or part of ex-
perience. For it was the dialectic as the name of 
I 
our existential urge to know which led us to the 
Begrif~ level and hence to our analogy. 
,Furthermore, when we take our own experience as 
1. Wallace, LOH, 287. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
an analogy for reality, we must have some principle 
which gives both the unity and diversity reflected 
I 
in thap experience to nature and society. The dialectic 
in experience gives unity and diversity to experience 
by ordering it into the three levels of Sein, Wesen and 
I Begriff. If we can arrange nature and society into 
this form, then unity and diversity will be provided 
them also. As a matter of fact, if we can arrange every 
I 
elemenp of our experience which has evidential value 
by virt ue of its being regular and refractory into the 
form o+ the dialectic, then the use of our analogy 
. I . 
will have been justified, and we can treat reality, 
indeedr as mind. 
I 
We could not do so had the dialectic been a device 
alien to experience, for the analogy chosen would not 
' 
allow such a procedure. Nor could we have done so had 
I -
the dialectic been only a part of experience, for th~ 
we would have been unfaithful to the analogy adopted. 
I 
Since t his is not the case, we are fully justified in 
using the dialectic for the purposes mentioned above. 
As a matter of fact, such is Hegel's program in his 
I 
relentless search to satisfy his urge to know. 
1 Philosophy, and specifically metaphysics, may 
I be defined as the search for a proper analogy, which if 
I taken as reality, will account for the kind of experience 
I 
we have. Philosophy is a search for a completeness which 
I 
I 
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satislfies an indiVidual's demand for an intelligible 
account of whatever has occured within human experience 
I 
and is for Hegel an explanation of human experience 
in it;s completeness by lru.man experience in its complete-
ness. This is the third meaning attributed to the 
real is rational and the rational is real. 
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J4• Stace's Hegel 
,Stace maintains that each category o£ Hegel's 
logic is logically deduced from its predecessors. We 
have seen that such is not the case. For the categories 
in Hegel's logic do not £ollow each other according to 
I 
any logical rule of transformation. Rather, their order 
I 
and nature are determined by phenomenological or epistemic 
necess~ ty, a necessity which is not logical but empirical. 
lstace maintains that the Absolute is complete in 
the se1 se that everything else can be deduced from it 
while it explains itself. However, i£ the Absolute 
I is only the analogy of human experience, then it is at 
once c9mplete, incomplete and incompletable. It is 
complete in the sense in which my own experience is complete, 
that is, I am myself and at the moment at Which I assert 
this statement, my own experience includes Whatever has 
occured to me in some fonn or another. If it did not, 
then it would not be my own experience and I would not 
I 
be myse'lf. 
I t ~ is incomplete in the sense that at the moment 
I asse~t I will change, I anticipate that my experience 
will cJ ange, that some new content will be added and 
' hence i l will not be what it was and is; hence I will 
not be myself. 
~t is incompletable in the sense that only death 
preventls the inclusion of more content. Thus my own 
experie r ce has potentially an unlimited capacity for content. 
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~herefore, we cannot say that the Absolute is a 
self edclosed sphere and complete. Even if it were a 
logicalJ system, it would not be complete, for Goedel' s 
proof ~as shown us that every logical system is incompletable.l 
/Further, any pan-logi&m would commit infidelity with 
regard /to Hegel's conception of empiricism. For, the 
necess~ty which we discover in logic is an abstraction from 
the nel/essity we find in our experience as a whole. 
This is analqgous to the selection of only part 
of expj rience to account for experience as a whole. If 
we choose only one part, we must assert that the objective 
refere~ce of other parts is not justified but illusory. 
I For example, to choose logic as an analogy requires an 
admiss i on that contingency is not real. But contingency, 
that i f , the uncertainty of our knowledge and its in-
complej eness is one of the essential characteristics of 
knowledge. All have undergone the experience of dis-
coveril g that what was once believed with such vigour is 
not qu1te adequate. 
I 
This feeling of inadequacy and the 
attempt to relieve the feeling with something more adequot e 
is wna
1 
prompts us to go on to metaphysics. But if contingency 
is illusory, then the feeling of inadequacy experienced 
with cbntingency, although not necessarily illusory, is 
certa~ly unjustified. To discover that the reason for 
postulr ting a logical system to supply an adequate account of 
I 1. Qu ne, ML, 312. 
experience is an unjustifiable reason is to attribute the 
need f r1 r metaphysics to caprice. 
This not only applies to those who would assert 
that certainty can be achieved but also to those who 
assertl that no adequate account can be constructed. For,_ 
if no I dequate account can be constructed, if all that we 
can act ieve are greater degree;s of uncertainty, then the 
feeling of adequacy concomitant with the occasional 
I diminution of perplexity and doubt, however fragmentary, 
is not only unjustified but illusory. But again, if this 
satisfr ction is illuoory' the movement which leads us to 
the ill usion, although not necessarily illusory, is certainly 
unjustttfied. If such movenBnt is unjustified, then the 
reason for asserting that uncertainty is everywhere is 
tlso cjaprice. Therefore, we must attribute dogmatism and 
skeptif ism to caprice. 
1 Caprice will not allow us to develop any principle 
of intl lligibility nor any analogy for i"reality. For these 
reasonls, Stace 1 s interpretation of Hegel in light of the a~lys[ s and interpretation presented in thia thesis must 
be chel ae terized as inadequate. 
I 
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Chapter IV 
GENUINE ALTERNATIVES TO HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 
1. Genuine Positivism 
Are t here any genuine alternatives to Hegel's 
procedure? 
First of all, we can quite legitimately refuse to 
move on to Begriff. It is quite true that Hegel's urge 
to know receives its richest satisfaction on this level. 
But some of us, without the courage to perform on this 
level or with the courage not to perform on this level, 
may find suff icient satisfaction of Eros on the level of 
Wesen Ialone. That is, the philosophy we practice is the 
philos ~ophy of science and the philosophy of logic and 
matheJ atics. When we make any statement about reality 
on this level or choose not to speak of reality at all, 
we must remember that the reality of which we speak or 
because of which we are mute is not the same kind of 
reali~y as the one sought on the Begpiff level. 
For reality on the Begriff level is that which will 
account for the kind of unity and kind of variety found 
within human experience as a whole. But reality on the 
Wesen 1level is, perhaps, nature as a whole and a nature 
which is most susceptible to the analysis carried out 
in the physical sciences; that is, a nature without, for 
I 
example, the aesthetic or the value or the religious elements. 
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On the other hand, reality might be some unknowable 
which does account for the kind of experience we have but 
I 
about ¥hich we can say nothing. The impossibility of 
attributing any characteristic to this reality might be 
the result of the limitations of conceptual thought, as 
we havl pictured such limitations; hEnce, the phenomenalism 
of saml philosophies of science. . 
Therefore, our conception of reality is simply 
not the same kind of reality as that eulogized by the 
philos bpher of Begriff. When we say his statements are 
meaninkle ss, we mean that they just do not make sense to 
I 
I 
us as f he statements in our philosophy do. 
t Of course, Hegel might reply to .this discussion 
that genuine positivism does not really satisfy the 
urge t l know. For the scientist qua person cannot escape 
the Be kriff level of experience, since both the Sein and 
I 
Wesen ~evels of experience are part of Begriff. The 
concepfual apparatus which serves as the tool for prediction 
and control is part of the Wesen level while sensory 
verifi bation Which serves to sophisticate this conceptual 
tool ir part of the ~ level of experience. Any sensory 
verifil ation is always a first person experience no matter 
how wir e a range of inter-subjective agreement is achieved. 
For sur h agree100nt is achieved by one person saying "I see 
such and suchu, by another person saying 11 I see such and 
such", l etc., to a point where each person as first person 
comes : o agree that the other person is 
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having very much the s~e kind of experience he is having. 
Neither science nor logic is simply a set of state-
ments. It is the scientist or the logician carrying on 
his respective discipline. As scientist and not science, 
as logician and not logic, as mathematician and not 
mathematics,the Whole individual is at work; the name 
of this whole individual is Begriff. 
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But Hegel might reply to his own objection by pointing 
out that what is under discussion here is not science 
nor mathematics nor logic but philosophy. Philosophy 
is conceived to be hltimate not in any honorific sense 
but in a descriptive sense as that Which gives richest 
satisfaction to the urge to know. Whereas the scientist 
qua scientist, the poet qua poet, the logician ~logician 
are prevented from moving on to the Begeiff level, the 
philosopher is not. The scientist must operate on the 
Sein and W9 sen levels but as a scientist he is Begriff. 
The poet must operate on mat appears to be the Sein 
level alone but as a poet he is Begriff. The logician 
must remain within the Wesen level but as logician he 
is Begr:iff. 
But the ·philosopher can look to all areas of ex-
perience and try to account for experience as a whole. 
The philosopher does so be cause he is prompted by the 
need to satisfy completely his urge to know. 
The genuine logical positivist, however, prompted 
by this same urge, may discover when he arrives at the 
Begriff level and follows Hegel's procedure that he is 
not as satisfied as he thought he might have been. \f.ho 
is to say that all sugar will taste as sweet and all lemon 
wil1 taste as sour. The satisfaction which is achieved 
by the metaphysician to whom sugar tastes vary sweet and 
lemon tastes very sour,a satisfaction of his entire per-
son, may not be so achieved by the positivist engaging 
in metaphysics. 
He may discover that such satisfaction is afforded 
him When he cohsiders only the scientist and his science 
on the Wesen and Sein levels, and the mathematician and 
his mathematics on the Wesen level alone. In such a case, 
tbe positivist as a whole person, that is, the positivist 
qua Begriff, satisfies the urge of Begriff by concentrating 
on levels of experience lower than Begriff. By doing so, 
sug:ar:eta ste s sweet and lemon tastes sour pnly when eaten 
between ~,als. 
But unlike the scientist qua scientist who can 
never move on to Begriff, unlike the poet qua poet 
or the mathematician who can never move on to Begt=iff, 
the genuine positivist has done so and found it lacking. 
lle has not, however, moved to another level of experience. 
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He remains at Begriff but concentrates on levels of experience 
other than Begriff. In this way, the quality of his satisfaction 
remains the same as that of the metaphysician, but the 
quantity is not the same as that achieved by the individual 
who searches for Aristotle's wisdom or Hegel's Absolute. 
From this it can be seen that the genuine positivist 
does not try to apply any other analogy less than Begriff 
to account for Begriff. Stace, however, in his inter-
pretation of Hegel does so by trying to account for Begrif£ 
by applying an analogy supplied by Wesen, namely, the analogy 
provided by logical coherence. 
Therefore, the position taken by the logical positivist 
can be defended from the point of view of this thesis' 
interpretation of Hegel's conception of philosophy, but 
Stace 1 s interpretation cannot.1 
1. It is obvious that if the positivist's criteria of 
meaning are taken to be synthetic statements regarding the 
nature of meaning, then genuine positivists would be quite 
rare and those positivists who are not genuine would be in 
contradiction to this thesis' interpretation of Hegel's con-
ception of philosophy. However, if the positivist's criteria 
of meaning are proposals regarding the use of language, than 
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the genuine positivist is not so rare. For what the positivist 
intends if these criteria are proposals is that all scientific 
and mathematical statements be treated as meaningful because 
these two enterprises are valuable to him. Therefore, the 
positivist's criteria of meaning are logically sophisticated ways 
of saying 11 I prefer science and mathematics to metaphysics" and 
statements to the effect that metaphysics is meaningless are 
2. A Different Empiricism 
However, 1r1e may choose to operate from the Begriff 
level. If we do, we can always change our conception of 
empiricism. We may take delight in assuming, at the beg-
inning of inquiry, all that we can in order to assert that 
just as there is no reason~ priori for dismissing an area 
of experience as having eVidential value, so there is no 
~ priori reason for including any area of experience as 
having evidential value. We may do whatever we like, 
~ priori. We can give primacy to sense experience, to 
value experience or to aesthetic experience~ therefore, for 
~ priori reasons. 
But if we do, we are unfaithful to the urge which 
prompted us to move on to Begriff. For example, if we make 
sense experience primary, then we are forced into a mater-
ialistic metaphysics Which denies prima facie evidential 
value to our value experience, our aesthetic experience, 
our religious experience, etc.. This prima facie evidential 
is part of the unity and variety of WLich we are trying to 
give an account and for Which we are trying to account. 
72 
To discover that our feeling of objective reference as applied 
to these areas is an illusion is analogous our telling a 
person., suf'fering from feelings of superiority because 
he is, in fact, inferior, that he really does not feel superior. 
ways of saying "I do not prefer metaphysics". In this case, 
genuine positivism is compatible with this thesis' inter-
pretation of Hegel's conception of philosophy. 
It simply is not so. He really does reel superior, even 
though he may not, in ract, be superior. 
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IIr we add to this arg~ent the ract that any selection 
or an area or experience without an independent inquiry into 
its evidential value begs the question regarding the criterion 
or truth, we must conclude that the most adequate conception 
or empiricis.m is the one orrered by Hegel. 
3. A Different Empiricism 
The dialectic as the source of the urge to know 
is the direct reason for Hegel's movement to the analogy 
of human eA~erience. Once this analogy is selected, 
however, to apply the dialectic to all areas of experience 
is to treat it as the criterion of truth. Hm-Iever, it 
is not so much the dialectic which ms the criterion of 
truth as it is empirical coherence which is the criterion 
of' truth. For, in applying the dialectic as 1.-1e have in-
dicated above, what we are doing is to treat the 
analogy as a hypothesis and to investigate whether, as 
hypothesis, it is logically inconsistent, whether it 
contradicts other well established hypotheses, and t-Ihether 
it subsumes as much of experience as possible under its 
authority. In light of this description, it is not as 
necessary far us to arrange phenomena in the hierarchy 
dictated by the dialectic as it is necessary for us to 
test whatever analogy we select using empirical coherence 
as our criterion of truth, a criterion which is perhaps 
the normative form of the descriptive base, that is, the 
dialectic. 
However, tve may change this criterion of truth. 
We may choose logical coherence and arrive at a conception 
of reality Which allows us to say only that it is a bare 
felt unity, as Bradley does. Or we may choose empirical 
verification and arrive at a conception of reality as 
some sbrt of emergent evolution, as Alexander does. 
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e 
e 
But, since our conception or empiricism is the 
I 
one ~egel proposed, the nature or our explanation should 
I 
serve
1 
as a test for our criterion or truth. For, 1r 
genuine problems emerge upon the ap plication of this 
criterion, and if absurdities result from such problems, 
then we have been mistaken and our criterion of truth is 
not adequate. 
One of the most rigid of our requirements should 
I 
be that we preserve the integrity of our analogy. Ir 
we arpive at a conclusion which asserts that our analogy 
is not real, then we are caught in a curious dilemma. 
For, our conclusion is justified only under the assumption 
th8 t ,our analogy is real, if, for example, we have treated 
it asl such by using it as an analogy. But our conclusion 
asserts that our use of it as real is rallacious. This 
is one of the absurdities mentioned above. Something 
is wrong and this something most probably is our criterion 
of truth. 
There seems to be an intimate connection between 
our conception or empiricism and our criterion of truth. 
It is difficult to see how, if we adopt Hegel's con-
ception of empiricism, we can avoid using empirical 
coherence as our criterion of truth. 
I 
4. A Different Analogy 
As our last alternative, the analogy used may be 
changed. Bergson does this by resorting to memory as 
the analogy which will best account for the kind of unity 
and variety found within his experience. But he does so 
I 
only because he 
I 
is fascinated with novelty. Novelty, 
however, is not 
experil nce. To 
the only phenomenon occurring in our 
treat it as if it were is to comndt in-
fidelity regarding the nature of our experience. 
l It is difficult to see how, if we adopt Hegel's 
conception of empiriciffin and his criterion of .truth, we 
can avoid using the totality of our experience ~s that 
analogy which will best account for the kind of unity 
and va!iiety found within experience. 
1 
This feeling is made even more intense vilen we 
consider that any other analogy is either an(). abstraction 
from experience as a whole or an invention foreign to 
experience as a whole. In either case, we are being 
unfait~ful to our conception of empiricism and our 
criter~on of truth. 
I 
\We ma~ conclude, therefore, that if we accept 
Hegel•s conception of empiricism and empirical coherence 
I 
as our !criterion of truth, the analogy used by Hegel 
to account for the kind of unity and kind of variety 
desired must be the one we accept also. 
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5. A Method of Verification 
lwe cannot choose other than to operate from the 
Begriff level of experience. But we can choose whether, 
from that level of experience, we shall concentrate on 
Begriff, or concentrate on Sein, Wssen, or a combination 
of both depending on which satisfies our urge to know. 
That is, although philosophy is not necessarily personal-
istic, it is certainly not impersonal. The choice made 
is the product of an individual in light of What sat isfies 
his urge to know. But once this choice is made, however 
esoteric it may be, we know on What level of experience 
we are concentrating. From the Begriff level, the 
principles are public, namely, our conception of empiricism, 
I 
our criteri on of truth and the analogy we choose to explain 
the kind of unity and variety found within that level of 
I 
experience upon Which we are concentrating. 
The fact that these three are public indicates 
that philosophy does, in fact, have a method of verification. 
Real, not illusory, progress can be achieved. There is no 
justification for pessimism. But neither is there just-
ification f or pride as Bradley indicates in saying: 
I. ... . .... I have been obliged to speak of phil-
osophy as a satis£action of what might be 
called the mystical side of our nature ---L!:t 
1. The mystical side of our nature is taken to be the 
urge to lmot-v. 
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I 
a satisfaction which, by certain other 
I 
persons cannot be procured otherwise. 
And I may have given the impression that 
I take the meta physician to be initiated 
\ into something far higher than what the 
common herd possesses. Such a doctrine 
I would rest on a most deplorable error, 
the superstition that the mere intellect 
is the highest side of our nature, and 
the false idea that in the intellectual 
world work dome on higher subjects is for that 
reason higper work. Certainly the life 
\
of one man, in comparison with that of 
another, may be fuller of the Divine, L!:( 
1
or again may realize with an intenser 
\
consciousness; but there is no calling 
or pursuit which is a private road to 
the deity. And assuredly, the way 
!through speculation upon ultimate truths, 
1although distinct and legitimate, is not 
superior to others. There is no sin 
however prone to it the philosopher 
may be, which philosophy can justify 
so little as spiritual pride.z 
1. Objection can be raised to the use of the word, Divine, 
I 
in thi i passage since there is nothing about a metaphysical 
object lwhich ~ P£iori qualifies it as religious, although 
the converse may be true. 
2. BrJdley, AR, 6. 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
Hegel's logic has been given a phenomenological 
inte~etation. Such an interpretation has established 
the ~ level of experience as the analogy for reality. 
An adehuate conception of re:ality is that analogy which 
will bi st account for the unity and variety of human 
experi~nce as a whole. The unity of such experience 
I is to IDe found on the Sein level of experience. The 
I 
variet is to be found on the Wesen level. 
Hegel's conception of empiricism has been described 
as the treatment of each element of experience as having 
evidential value at the beginning of inquiry. All such 
elemenJ s are t6 be found within the Sein level of experience. 
His principle of intelligibility is ~dialectic: first, 
I . 
the urge of an individual to understand those elements 
I 
which domprise his experience; second, the structuring 
of his experience into the Se1n, Wesen and Begriff levels, 
the Se:1Jn level repre:senting experience and the awareness 
I 
of its contents, the Wesen level representing the awareness 
of the contents of experience and the awareness of that 
awareness, the Begriff level representing the individUal 
complet \ely self aware; third, the dialectic is that 
I 
I princip~e which will decide what elements have greater 
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or less\ evidential value by ordering them into the triadic 
pattern mentioned above; fourth, the dialectic is Begriff 
itself, for Begriff contains within itself the other two levels. 
Hegel's conception of philosophy is the choosing 
I 
of a pl oper analogy which -will account for the kind of 
experil nce an individual undergoes. Experience at the 
Begriffl level is that analogy. The analogy is then tested 
by tryi~g to arrange all of experience into the triadic 
patterJ of Sein, Wesen and Begriff. Here empirical 
cohereJ ce is used as the criterion of truth and may be 
descri, ed as the normative f'orm of' the dialectic given 
the fil st meaning above. 
Positivism has been found to be compatible with 
Hegel's conception of philosophy only if a comparison is 
made by the individual between metaphysics and analytic 
philosophy. If the philosopher discovers that metaphysics 
does n+ pPovide the qum ti ty of' satisf'action af'farded 
by analytic philosophy, then positivism can be pursued 
without being contrary to Hegel's conception df philosophy. 
~alytic philosophy does not apply any analogy to 
account for Begriff. But Stace's interpretation of Hegel's 
position does offer an analogy to account for Begriff but 
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one dif~erent from Hegel 1 s mm analogy. Stace has Hegel 
apply t he analogy provided by Wesen to account for Begriff. 
Such an interpretation is not compatible with the one offered 
in this thesis. It is unfaithful to Hegel's conception of 
empiricism and his conception of philosophy. No part of ex-
perienc~ can account for experience as a whole. Stace 1 s choice 
I 
of logil as that analogy abstracts from experience, rende ring 
it static and complete and thus turns Hegelfs logic into 
inadl quate an system. All of Hegel's illusions to experience 
must b l judged illegitimate. This renders invalid crucial 
parts of the Logic and turns the Phenomenology of Mind into 
an irr~levant enterprise. 
1
1 
Hegel's philosophy is not a deductive system. It 
is not hen-empirical. It is an inductive, empirical, 
existe~tial system, urging the philosopher to take into 
I 
account what prompted him to be a philosopher while ad-
\ . 
monisht ng him not to arrive at conclusions which are un-
justif:iled by the content and quality of his ex:r:erience as 
I 
well as by that very urge to know. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an investigation into Hegel's logic 
and hir conception of philosophy. Its purpose is to give 
a reas nable interpretation to his logic and to determine I . • 
what c tnstitutes his conception of philosophy and its re-
lation 1to contemporary philosophy. Further, this thesis 
i 
also c ~mpares its interpretation with that given by Stace 
::i:::l~ne which is the more justified in light of the 
!The first three categories of ~ are the following: 
Being fs simple and immediate awareness; Nothing is the 
awarene\ss of that simple and irnn:e diate awareness; Becoming 
is the !interplay between the first two, that is, the process 
by which an individual comes to know an object. 
I fhe first three cat egar ie s of vlesen are the following: 
Identitf is the awareness of the object; Difference is the 
awarenebs of the awareness of the object; Ground is the 
interpl ry between the two, that is, the process by ~ich 
an indifidual comes to know the idea of an object. 
fhe first three categories of Begriff are the following: 
the Universal is the awareness of the idea of an object; 
the Part icular is the awareness of the awareness of the idea 
I 
I 
of an object; the Individual is the completely self aware 
I person as the interplay between the first two. 
I 
Hence, ~is the realm of immediate experience. 
I Wesen is the realm of science and mathematics. Begriff 
is the completely selr individual and the realm of metaphysics. 
Hegel's conception of philosophy involves the choice 
of an \ nalogy which can account ror the unity and variety 
found ra experience. This experience is Begriff since it 
contains both the unity or Sein and the divers.ity of Wesen. 
The: anl logy chosen is Begri~itself. 
Hegel's conception of empiricism proposes that 
every ingredient within Sein be treated as evidential at 
I -
the beginning of inquiry. His principle of intelligibility 
is the dialectic, the name of a very personal urge to know 
which l rompts the individual to go on to Begri ff, which 
orgsniJ es experience into the three levels or ~ Wesen, 
and Be ·riff, and is Begriff, itself. 
\stace•s analysis asserts that Hegel uses an analogy 
from we\sen, ~arnely, logic to account for Begr:iff. Such 
an asse tion violates Hegel's conception of empiricism, 
ignores his conception of philosophy and does not take 
into acr ount the nature of the dialectic. 
r alyt ic philcs ophy is compatible with Hegel Is 
conception of philosophy only if the analytic philosopher 
has made\ a· comparison between analytic philosophy and meta-
physics to find that the latter does not satisfy his urge 
to know as well as the former. 
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